Friday, October 2, 2009

Cambodia is not a Province of Thailand: (Suvaṇṇabhūmi is just the Name of an Airport)

October 1st, 2009 · No Comments · Culture​ វប្បធម៌​, History ប្រវត្តិសាស្រ្ត

By Eisel Mazard*

July, 2009

§1.

“Suvaṇṇabhūmi” is not just the name of an airport: it has been an important part of Thai propaganda for over 100 years. Today, the myth of “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” is used to claim that all of Cambodia, Laos and even Vietnam were formerly part of Thailand, but were later “lost” in a series of wars. This article presents a series of facts about the real history of Southeast Asia. The original text was written in simplified English, intended for translation.

Many Thai people alive today heard about “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” from their grandparents, so they assume this is a very old idea. Many Thai people grew up hearing propaganda that their ancient homeland was in Yunnan (a province in China, north of Laos) –but then the message changed. Sometimes the government tells them the ancient homeland is “here” in this ancient kingdom called “Suvaṇṇabhūmi”, sometimes they say it is in Shan State (now part of Burma), sometimes in Southern China or even further north than China, in Mongolia. Sometimes the government tells them to hate the Burmese, sometimes the Chinese, sometimes Cambodians. They told their people to hate and fear Communists, but (at the same time) they supported the Khmer Rouge. The result is that Thai people are genuinely confused about their own history.

Most Thai people do not hate Cambodians. Most Thai people know that Thailand is full of ancient Khmer monuments, but they do not know why. Despite everything their government tells them, most Thai people know they received their Buddhist tradition from Cambodia: when they get Buddhist tattoos, or buy magic amulets, they always want the writing to be in old-fashioned Khmer letters. When they visit museums and ancient ruins, they see that the old stones are written in Khmer letters, too. Most Thai people know that Phimai (north of the city of Korat) is an important place, but do not understand why the ancient city there is Cambodian (not Thai). They visit places like Lopburi, and can see that the oldest buildings there are Cambodian (not Thai) but they do not understand why.

When people are confused, sometimes they get angry. However, many of Thai people are willing to listen to the truth about their country’s history. The new propaganda that Thailand’s kings lost so much territory contradicts some of the older propaganda. Most Thai people learned that the same kings expanded the country’s territory in the same period of history. Nobody in Thailand wants to believe that King Rama V lost territory (even if the new government propaganda says so). Most Thai people would be offended if you said that all these famous Kings lost so many wars, and lost so much territory: most of the history they already know is about the same kings winning wars and expanding Thailand’s territory.

So, the present political conflict is an opportunity to learn about history; understanding the history will help us to understand the conflict.

§2.

What is the earliest origin of the “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” propaganda? The answer is very easy for English people to read about, but very difficult to find if you are reading in Thai or Khmer. A man named James Prinsep translated many important stone inscriptions in India, and published his research in 1837. That may seem like a long time ago, but this is modern history: before 1837, nobody in Thailand was interested in “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” and almost nobody knew the name of the emperor “Ashoka”.

After James Prinsep translated the inscriptions of Ashoka into English, people in Southeast Asia became very excited about the earliest origins of Buddhism (and began re-writing history). In Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, new myths were written, trying to prove that this ancient emperor in India sent “Buddhist Missionaries” to their own countries.

In Burma, interpretations trying to prove that Burmese Buddhism came directly from India were published; at the same time, in Thailand people tried to interpret the same stone inscriptions in another way to prove that Buddhism came to Thailand first, not Burma.

Some of this was “nationalist propaganda”, but some of it was just silly enthusiasm. Europeans scholars had published exciting “news” about the ancient world, and it changed the way people thought about the history of Buddhism. 100 years later, it had changed the way people think about nationalism, too. Still today, most people in Thailand have a vague sense that “Ashoka” was an important King, who somehow “gave” Buddhism to Thailand. It isn’t true, but people have been talking about it since 1837.

What is the truth? The truth is that Ashoka lived around the year 260 B.C. (more than 2,200 years ago!). It is important to think clearly about just how ancient that is. Ashoka lived more than 1000 years before the oldest Pali and Sanskrit inscriptions ever found in Cambodia. At that time, there were no Thai people in “Thailand” and Angkor Wat did not exist. Nobody in Southeast Asia was Buddhist at that time. The Emperor Ashoka was important because he helped to establish Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka. The truth is that Buddhism arrived in Cambodia much later than Ashoka (almost 1000 years later!).

Anyone who can read Pali can read the inscriptions of Ashoka themselves (the language used is similar to Pali, however, it is not correct to say that they are written in Pali, as there are differences of spelling and dialect). Most of the difficult work in transcribing and translating Ashoka’s inscriptions was already finished 100 years ago. Unfortunately, while these books are available in English, they are not published Cambodian; if would be wonderful if charities in Phnom Penh started to support translation projects of this kind. (For example, Alfred C. Woolner’s book from 1924, titled Asoka: Text and Glossary, could be translated into Khmer.)

§3.

Many people who grew up in Thailand will now be asking, “What about the story of the two monks Soṇa and Uttara? The Thai government did not invent that story!” While it is true that the story comes from Sri Lanka (not Thailand) most of the propaganda does mis-represent the story.

The Thai museums imply that the journey of Soṇa and Uttara (from India to Thailand) is recorded in the edicts of Ashoka (this is not true), and then they suggest that the story records a series of historical and political facts. They never tell you who the author of this story is: it was not written by the Buddha, and not by the emperor Ashoka either! They do not really tell you what the story is about, or why it is supposed to be important.

The simple truth is that the story of Soṇa and Uttara is a fable. It does not say anything about Thailand, and it does not name any Thai king; it does not describe any historical event in Thailand, and it is not even a story about two Indian monks going to Thailand.

It is a story about two monks who go to a magical kingdom where a sea-monster (nāga) is eating all of the king’s sons. The monks have an adventure trying to defeat this sea-monster. In the end, they magically protect the kingdom by chanting in Pali. This impresses the local people, who then convert to Buddhism. To thank the two monks, the Royal family decides to name the new prince “Soṇuttara”, combining their names; in fact, out of gratitude, they vow to name all of their kings “Soṇuttara” in the future. This is possibly a joke that doesn’t translate very well: “Soṇa” means “Dog” in Pali, and “Uttara” means “ultimate”.

There is no reason for anyone to think that the “Golden-land” mentioned in this story is Thailand. Everything about the story seems to describe a place in ancient India but even so, it is a magical place: it is possible that no specific place in the real world was alluded to. There is no reason why any sane person would think this story contains historical facts of political importance.

Does anyone in Thailand really know how silly this story is? It was translated into English for the first time over 100 years ago, in 1908 (Wilhelm Geiger’s translation of the Mahāvaṃsa); the Thai propaganda about Soṇa and Uttara was probably based on that English-language source. This is a common pattern in Thai propaganda: is easier to read English translations than to study the original Pali. A lot of the pseudo-history of Thailand was inspired by European research that was new at the time.

The story of Soṇa and Uttara was written in medieval Sri Lanka (not in ancient India); while some stories of that period contain historical information, this particular story is just a fable intended to entertain children. For 100 years, many Western scholars have pointed to evidence that this Suvaṇṇabhūmi was within mainland India, while others have suggested it was western Burma. The truth is that it doesn’t matter where it was: this “golden land” mentioned in a fable is completely irrelevant to the history of Thailand. The story itself was totally unknown in Thailand until modern governments started making propaganda out of it.

§4.

The propaganda about “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” became more important in a series of wars in the 20th century.

When Prince Damrong wrote the history of Thailand, he created the myth that Thai people originated in Mongolia (in mountains further north than China), and that they formerly had a kingdom in Yunnan (South-Western China, further north than Laos). The myth is that the Thais were the rulers and inhabitants of the “Nan-Chao” kingdom; this was the name of a real kingdom in Yunnan, but the idea that it was populated by Thai people is fiction.

Prince Damrong invented this theory. He wrote that the Thai people were driven out of China in the year 143 B.C., but even the number is a complete fiction. There was never any evidence that this happened; still today, there is no evidence. There is no source for the event (nor for the specific year) except the imagination of Prince Damrong. He also invented the number 5000 B.C. for the year of the Thai migration from Mongolia to Yunnan. This allows a few thousand years for them to walk to Dali (大理 in the middle of Yunnan province, also written “Tali-fu” in old books) and rule the Nan-Chao kingdom (starting around 2200 B.C.). It is all fiction: neither Mongolia nor Dali have anything to do with the history of the Thai people.

There is not one stone inscription anywhere in China to prove Damrong’s theory, but Cambodia is full of inscriptions that record the truth about Thailand’s history. And the truth is that most of Thailand was formerly part of Cambodia.

This is not news. Many Thai authors have already written critiques of Prince Damrong’s history, including Nidhi Eoseewong (who is probably the most famous and respected Thai historian of the last 50 years). For a good article on the history of writing history in Thailand, see: Charmavit Kasetsiri, “Thai Historiography from Ancient Times to the Modern Period”. This article was published in a book called _Perceptions of the Past in South East Asia_, in 1979, by the Asian Studies Association of Australia. (Maybe this should have a Khmer translation too?) More recently, Suriya Ratanakul has published criticism of Thai origin theories from a linguistic perspective (e.g., “Tai People and their Languages”, Mahidol, 1990). Many Thai scholars have contributed reasonable perspectives on these historical issues to the International Conference of Thai Studies (a forum that is deemed “safe” for criticizing official propaganda, perhaps because it is predominantly conducted in English).

Apart from the fact that Prince Damrong’s myth isn’t true, we have a lot of confusion because the propaganda keeps changing.

The “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” theory began with the idea that Thai people left China (moving from North to South) and conquered a large part of Southeast Asia. As simple as this sounds, the theory already has a problem, because 143 B.C. is several centuries too late for the Emperor Ashoka to send his missionaries to Thailand: even if we wanted to believe Damrong, there could be no Thai people in Thailand to welcome their guests from India (ca. 260 B.C.). There is another problem today, because people in Thailand are now taught that they are the descendants of the people preserved in Ban Chieng who were already in Isan (N.E. Thailand) 6,500 years ago (but this site had not yet been discovered in Damrong’s time).

Cambodia did not fit into that propaganda very well, and Damrong’s work doesn’t really attempt to explain the history of Laos, Vietnam or Cambodia (it just asserts Thailand’s history, without making it coherent with any of the evidence from adjacent countries). However, while Damrong was still alive, the Thais had new problems on their Eastern frontier, and started to write new propaganda in response to it.

The “advantage” of Damrong’s version of history was that it justified Thailand starting a war to conquer Shan State. Damrong’s most famous book on history is simply titled “Thai Fight Burma”, published in 1917. Most of his theories are anti-Burmese and anti-Chinese. So, in the beginning, “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” was used to justify wars to expand Thailand to the North and to the West.

In 1931, Luang Wichitwathakan published his version of Thai history. He later became the head of the “Department of Fine Arts” and spent his life producing propaganda. His efforts were not limited to writing books: he also produced dramas performed on stage and songs broadcast on radio. He was a major influence in Thai popular culture, as well as in the “high culture” of written history. There was a transition in the 1930s from Prince Damrong’s propaganda to Luang Wichitwathakan’s version. Damrong felt that he was excluded from Thailand’s politics after 1932. In fact, Damrong’s books continued to be used in classrooms, but they did not feature the new ideas that Thai propaganda was then concerned with (”Communism”, “Democracy”, etc.).

§5.

Thai History was written and re-written rapidly in the years leading up to World War Two. When the Thais (very briefly) occupied Shan State (in collusion with the Japanese) they published maps and propaganda declaring it “the original Thai homeland”. They published a new wave of Suvaṇṇabhūmi propaganda after their victory in the Franco-Thai war of 1941. There was a rush to produce propaganda fast enough to justify Thailand’s territorial claims from 1941 to 1947, as the Thais really believed that they had an opportunity to conquer all of “French Indochina” at the end of World War Two.

However, in 1947 everything changed: the British signed a new treaty with Burma (the “Atlee Treaty”) ending Thai hopes of ruling Shan State, and the French recognized a new constitution for Laos as a separate nation. In the same year, Thailand had yet another “coup d’état”, and began negotiations with the U.N. “Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission”.

These negotiations in 1947 are much more important than the maps that UNESCO is now evaluating for the dotted-line around Preah Vihear. In 1947, the Thai government told this special “Commission” at the U.N. that Thailand had always been the historical ruler of all of Laos, and at least ruled Battambang, if not all of Cambodia. The Thai argument was that France had somehow tricked the world into thinking Laos and Cambodia were separate countries, when they were really provinces of Thailand; therefore, the provinces should be returned to Thailand as the French were leaving. Of course, that is also a myth: it is the myth of “Suvaṇṇabhūmi”, already explained.

The U.N. was thus expected, “…to decide on the claims… which would expand the territory of Thailand all the way to the Vietnamese border… [and] the Commission rejected in its final report all of Thailand’s claims.” I am quoting an article by Pheuipanh Ngaosyvathn, published in 1985, in a Western academic journal titled _Asian Survey_ (Vol. 25, issue 12, p. 1242-1259).

This 1947 U.N. decision is important for Cambodian people to know about. The Thai military did not request a few kilometers of land around a particular temple; they wanted to conquer all of Laos, and as much of Cambodia as they could take.

§6.

The UNESCO paperwork concerning the fate of this single temple omits the real drama of history that created the border. For this reason, most of the debate “misses the point”.

The French won a war against Thailand in 1893. Negotiations then began between France and England (from 1893-6) to decide Thailand and Cambodia’s borders. At that time, the British and French were very concerned with the control of Shan State and Yunnan (but did not care very much about Cambodia). Neither the Thai nor the Cambodians had a voice in those debates. The result was the Anglo-French settlement of 1896.

Today, it is difficult for Thai people to imagine that Shan State and Yunnan are really so important; however, both the British and the French wanted to build railroads to Yunnan (starting in the 1870s). In the 1880s and 1890s, many people thought there would be a war because France, England and Thailand all wanted to control Shan State (in order to control the imaginary railroad). Prince Damrong’s propaganda reflects the political concerns of that era, looking North and West from Bangkok (seeking to control Shan state and expand into China).

However, Europeans have their own bias in writing this history. Almost nothing by written by Europeans (nor even the UN) mentions that the French army was defeated in 1941. The Thai army did defeat the French army in 1941, prior to the Japanese occupation. This means that the earlier agreements (of 1902) were made invalid. Cambodians are more likely to remember their own rebellion against the French in 1942; both events (1941 & 1942) demonstrated the weakness of the French military in Southeast Asia.

Soon thereafter, the French were defeated by the Germans in Europe and defeated by the Japanese in Asia. Just a few years later, after the Japanese retreat, the French were defeated by the Communists (within the former French colonies) when they tried to re-assert control. That is at least three important military defeats in about 13 years (1941–54). These simple facts are omitted from European articles on this history: the facts are embarrassing to French nationalists, but they are important for understanding the ongoing border conflict (between Thailand and Cambodia).

The U.N. decision of 1947 was made in this context. This means that the history of the other agreements (and maps) is relatively trivial: the 1896 agreements (between the French and Thais) were made invalid in 1902 and all of the agreements of 1902 were made invalid again in 1941. In general, there was little-or-no representation for Cambodia at these negotiations; France also did not allow Cambodian representation at the armistice of 1954. This means that there was nobody at any of these meetings who could ask the obvious question of why Surin was assumed to be part of Thailand in the first place. The negotiations were defined by the threat posed by imperialist armies from Europe. When that threat disappeared, the logic behind the borders they had imposed disappeared, too.

Does anyone in Cambodia or Thailand really care about the details of the maps made for the 1902 agreements? The border disappears with the empire that defined it.

The collapse of the French empire left Cambodia and Laos with irrational borders; it also left Thailand with an identity crisis. The Thai are now struggling to reconcile the notion of their own “Thainess” with the legacy of far more ancient civilizations that now surround them, not only in Surin, but even as near as Nakon Pathom (almost a suburb of Bangkok).

Today, Thai propaganda offers us impassioned and self-contradictory claims: somehow, they say, the Thai were the original inhabitants of all these places, and yet they also think they are superior to the indigenous people they conquered when they arrived there. They cannot reconcile Thailand (as a geographic and political reality) with Thainess (as an ethnicity and a language-group).

§7.

Some of these contradictions are demonstrated in the most recent re-writing of Thai history that I can comment on: the efforts of Taksin’s government.

The Taksin government wanted to challenge the legacy of the Thai Fine Arts Department (founded by Luang Wichitwathakan, as mentioned, in the 1930s). The idea was to replace the old message with something more upbeat, positive, and suited to the bourgeois tendencies of the 21st century.

Opposition from within the Fine Arts Department was significant: unable to reform it, Taksin created the “O.K.M.D.” (Office of Knowledge Management and Development). This might be remembered as simply another “Taksin mega-project”; in fact, it was his own version of the Fine Arts Department, with a similarly broad agenda, including the creation of new museums.

Of course, one of the crucial differences is that the OKMD was almost purely a propaganda instrument, even if it was created with the “good intention” of replacing the version of history written by Prince Damrong. The OKMD did not have any responsibility for archaeology, nor for the conservation of artifacts; it was created simply to articulate the new government’s message to the people. That is, by definition, propaganda.

One acronym gives rise to another: the OKMD created the “N.D.M.I.” (National Discovery Museum Institute). The NDMI also had a very broad mandate, and was intended to take over a series of historical sites in downtown Bangkok (generally, old buildings already owned by the government) to create a series of museums. The first NDMI museum remains open, giving a permanent statement of the version of history that Taksin’s patronage created.

It is no surprise that the central concept of the museum is “Suvaṇṇabhūmi”: Taksin liked this idea so much that he named his airport after it. The museum repeats many important lies from the old propaganda, including the idea that Soṇa and Uttara brought Buddhism to Thailand. The museum also formally states the curators’ appreciation for Prince Damrong as the inventor of Suvaṇṇabhūmi as an historical concept.

However, this re-telling of Thai history is also responsive to some recent trends in European scholarship. In contrast to the old propaganda about “racial purity”, there is instead a message of harmonious “racial diversity”. There is dramatically less emphasis on the city of Sukhothai, and less emphasis on the unique King Ramkhamhaeng. Perhaps this was because international scholarship has proved the Ramkhamhaeng inscription to be a fraud; apart from that one inscription, there is no evidence that Ramkhamhaeng ever existed, nor that his empire ever existed (a collection of essays on this matter has been published by the Siam Society, in Thailand, incorporating several important articles by Michael Vickery).

Instead of trying to prove that Thailand existed as an ancient empire (alongside Cambodia), the NDMI propaganda simply states that there were no empires, and no nation-states, prior to the modern era. They re-draw the map as a series of city-states, and then claim that all of it had always been “Suvaṇṇabhūmi”. This may seem like a friendly (or non-confrontational) way to re-invent the myth, but it still means that the Thai government’s political position is that Cambodia never existed, and has no right to exist now.

The new propaganda gets rid of the (offensive) notion that the racially-superior Thai people migrated south and conquered Southeast Asia. However, it also avoids any clear timeline of anybody migrating anywhere (or anybody conquering anybody). The results of this new myth are also offensive. The same old story of Suvaṇṇabhūmi is simply being re-told without admitting that war, slavery and feudalism really were important parts of Thailand’s history: instead, we are given a message that the country was always built on trade, technology, and “ethnic harmony”.

I will not offer a lengthy criticism of the museum’s version of history in this article. However, the point here is simply this: although political concerns have changed, the myth of Suvaṇṇabhūmi is more prominent now than ever before. The Taksin government gave this term new impetus, and new prominence, presenting it as part of a new generation of propaganda. Every person who arrives at Bangkok airport is confronted with the myth of Suvaṇṇabhūmi as soon as they arrive, however it may be misspelled or mispronounced on their ticket or on the signs painted on the walls (Suwannaphum? Suvarnapoomee?).

§8.

As mentioned, from the 1930s up to 1947, the propaganda reflected different concerns, looking east from Bangkok. At that time, it seemed possible to extend Thai territory eastward, as the French Empire collapsed. Of course, the rapid rise and fall of the Japanese empire (in Southeast Asia) also encouraged expansionist schemes of this kind.

General Phibun Songkran, the same man who had (briefly) expanded Thai power into Burmese, Lao and Cambodian territory (1941–6), remained a pervading influence until 1958. In the late 1950s, the French army departed, the American army arrived, and, from the Thai perspective, the war to extend Thai territory simply continued under the name of “anti-Communism”.

From 1949–1961 the U.S. supported Chinese KMT (anti-Communist) troops living in Northern Thailand. The old propaganda about a war to re-conquer the so-called Thai homeland in Yunnan (as Damrong imagined it) would have seemed useful for a series of Thai governments that were then preparing for a war against Communist China (with American Support).

It is easy for Cambodians to forget that most of the Thai propaganda was not anti-Khmer in this period: it was mostly anti-Burmese and anti-Chinese. However, it is also fair to say that Cambodians have suffered much more from Thai military policy than anyone in Burma or China. The original “Domino Theory” was presented in 1952, as a justification for the American military to occupy former French Colonies as a barrier against Chinese Communism: the theory compares Communist influence to a game of dominoes, and was used to explain U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia until 1973.

In 1973, U.S. President Nixon made a pact with Communist China; this had many effects, all over the world, but it also (permanently) ended Thailand’s ambitions to conquer part of Yunnan. They had already lost the possibility of conquering Shan State, and now all of their Northward ambitions were made impossible. After 1973, eastward expansion was the only dream possible for the Thai military, and they became increasingly involved in America’s wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The cycle of propaganda and pseudo-history continued through decades of active armed conflict on the Thai-Khmer border.

The suffering and tragedy of these wars is not the subject of this article. What I would say here, simply, is that Thai propaganda was written to support specific political objectives. The Thai military elite did not abandon their claims to Cambodian territory when the U.N. rejected them in 1947: the Thai military’s objective has remained the conquest of former French colonies. The “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” myth remains one way of articulating this aspiration.

§9.

It is obvious that many of the Thais involved in these wars assumed that if they defeated Communism, Laos and Cambodia would become part of Thailand (or, at least, they would conquer Laos and Battambang). The Thai army invaded Laos in 1984, and then fought a larger war against Laos in 1987–8. They justified this as an attempt to win back the territory the French had stolen from Thailand. As we have discussed, the official propaganda states that everything east of Thailand was “Suvaṇṇabhūmi” before the French intervened.

This issue was not resolved in 1947, it was not resolved in 1987, and it is still not resolved today.

I would here suggest that, from the Thai military’s perspective, the Cambodian border conflict is similar to the Lao: they do not regard the line around just one temple as the problem. They consider the entire border illegitimate. The temple is just one opportunity to challenge that border. For many Thai nationalists in the military (or for anyone who believes the propaganda), Battambang is “lost” territory that Thailand must re-conquer, or else they just say that all of Cambodia should be a province of Thailand.

Is it any surprise that the Thai military claims French Indochina was formerly part of Thailand? In general, both Thai and Khmer people in the present generation have heard some aspects of this story from their grandparents, and learn other aspects from watching television. The different parts of the story never fit together, they never match with the jumble of information in the newspapers.

From a Cambodian perspective, looking North and West, it is obvious that a large part of Thailand is still ethnically Khmer, despite the last 300 years of history. Many Cambodians consider Surin a natural part of Cambodia. Of course, many Cambodians grew up in refugee camps on Thai territory (while the U.S., U.N. and the Thai military all supported Pol Pot). As a result, there are many families with ties on both sides of the disputed border. Among the farmers on the Thai side (in the “Lower Isan”, as some now call it) I think there is an unusual sense of kinship and cultural awareness, perhaps simply because there are so many looming monuments to the Cambodian culture that was once there. Those ancient monuments still put “the lower Isan” on the map, attracting visitors from around the world.

Nobody in Surin wants war. The pressure to go to war comes from a professionalized elite, who have decades of experience making war on exactly the same border. If they want war, sooner or later, they will have it.

[END]

*Eisel Mazard is an Independent Scholar (Theravada Asia)

Email: eisel.mazard@gmail.co

Website: http://www.pali.pratyeka.org

* Thanks Willem and the author for sharing this interesting article.

First rattan association of Cambodia, a step to sustainable rattan industry

01 October 2009
World Wildlife Foundation (WFF)

Phnom Penh, Cambodia – Eleven rattan small and medium enterprise owners and other community rattan processors from Phnom Penh and provinces meet on September 28th to officially form Cambodia’s first rattan association. The agenda will focus on election of a management committee and discussion over conditions and roles of current and future memberships.

"While the association is perceived by members as creating space and opportunity for key actors in the rattan production chain to meet and work together, this institutional initiative is described as a fundamental first step to achieve the goal of maintaining sustainable rattan production and supply. We are delighted to support this project and this activity in particular," said the representative of the European Commission's Delegation in Phnom Penh.

“The formation of the rattan association is critical to ensure understanding of community suppliers, processors and traders about the need to maintain sustainable supply of rattan for clean and better production,” said Mr Lip Cheang, a founder of the rattan association and owner of Kampuchea Samay Thmei rattan factory.

Fast growing economies elsewhere in the region are motivating rapid expansion of processing activities leading to demand for rattan resource at an unsustainable level. There is urgent need to establish a model of sustainable production that can support continuous growth of rattan in forests, while maintaining seasonal harvesting and sustainable supply.

“This is the right time for moving forward with concrete actions that help the development of rattan industry of Cambodia if the country is to export clean and high quality products into international markets, while continuing to sustainably manage rattan resource in forest,” said Mr Ou Ratanak, Rattan Project Manager from WWF.

The rattan association will first of all put a legal identity to a group of rattan suppliers and processors. Such an identity is important for the recognition of their action and goal by national and international societies.

“As a legally established entity, we can make our voice heard when we need support from the Government, for instance, with coordination from WWF and NGO partners, we will meet and dialogue with relevant ministries to obtain licence for our business so that we can legally export our products in the future,” Mr Lip Cheang said.

One of the operational objectives of the association is to also provide Cambodian processors with new knowledge and experience related to rattan, processing techniques, trade and markets. This will be the key learning platform and guide for them to improve their processing and product quality.

“The project identified that processors and exporters are not familiar with using the environmentally-friendly production techniques and that there is lack of understanding about international market requirements,” Mr Ratanak said.

“Limited skill to creatively diversify design and style also refrain Cambodian products from being competitive in the international market,” he added.

WWF is working with Institute for Environmental Science and Technology based in Hanoi and Artisans Association of Cambodia to improve the current non environmentally friendly production practices of rattan as such: wasteful use of rattan during processing, poor grading and storing as well as chemical use, which has negative impacts on the environment and therefore affects the product quality.

“One of the project’s major objectives, funded by European Union, is to engage small and medium enterprises in Cleaner Production, which aim at introducing proper techniques for processing activities to ensure a system of quality assurance,” said Mr Thibault Ledecq, Rattan Programme Manager from WWF.

For more information, contact:
asnarith.tep@wwfgreatermekong.org