2009/09/23
AP
A PROLONGED and intense drought may have contributed to the demise of Cambodia’s great ancient city Angkor, an American researcher said .
Brendan M Buckley said bands on tree rings that he and his colleagues have examined show that Southeast Asia was hit by a severe drought from 1415 until 1439.
That would coincide with the time period during which many archeologists believe Angkor collapsed. From the city of famed temples, Angkorian kings ruled over most of Southeast Asia between the ninth and 14th centuries.
During that time, they oversaw construction of architectural stone marvels, including Angkor Wat, regarded as a marvel of religious architecture and designated as a World Heritage Site by Unesco.
“Given all the stress the Khmer civilisation was under due to political reasons and so forth, a drought of the magnitude we see in our records should have played a significant role in causing its demise,” said Buckley, a research scientist at Columbia University’s Tree-Ring Laboratory in New York. Scientists have a historical record of droughts with the thickness of a tree’s rings. Since trees grow more during wet periods, the rings will grow thicker at those times. Trees grow less in dry times, so those rings will be thinner.
While the 1431 invasion from Siam – now Thailand – has long been regarded as a major cause of Angkor’s fall, archaeologists working at the sprawling temple site have long suspected that ecological factors played a role. The Greater Angkor Project is run by the University of Sydney in collaboration with the French archaeological group Ecole Francaise d’Extreme Orient and Apsara, the body responsible for the management of the Angkor World Heritage Park. The project concluded in 2007 that ancient Angkor had become unwieldy and that efforts to expand rice production to support a population of one million had led to vast deforestation, top-soil degradation and erosion.
Last year, the group went further to show that the deforestation resulted in flooding and huge amounts of sediment clogging the network of canals that was at the heart of the city’s vital water management system.
Dan Penny, a University of Sydney researcher who is a director at the Greater Angkor Project, said the new findings on drought will help researchers gain a greater understanding of why Angkor collapsed.
“Angkor was a civilisation obsessed with managing water. It was an agrarian society,” Penny said. “It’s hard to imagine that a society like that could have shrugged off 20 or 30 years of drought.”
However, Penny said it was likely that the drought was more of a contributing factor to the kingdom’s demise than a driving force. Not only was it forced to contend with the impacts of deforestation, but also attacks from the Siamese and the Cham of southern Vietnam.
“We have these droughts occurring on top of pre-existing pressures,” Penny said.
“Climate change was an accelerant,” he said. “It’s like pouring petrol on a fire. It makes social and economic pressures that may have been endurable disastrous.”
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
By March 2009, 4.3 Million Mobile Subscribers (penetration 29%) Were Recorded In Cambodia
New report provides detailed analysis of the Telecommunications market
Published on September 21, 2009
by Press Office
(Companiesandmarkets.com and OfficialWire)
LONDON, ENGLAND
Cambodia - Telecoms, Mobile, Internet & Forecasts
Despite its status as a least developed country and remaining one of the poorer countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia’s efforts to expand and upgrade its telecom infrastructure are bearing fruit. There was very little infrastructure remaining from before the tumultuous Khmer Rouge days. As a result, Cambodia bypassed rebuilding the fixed-line market and quickly launched into alternative technologies, jump-starting its telecommunications infrastructure with digital technology. Not surprisingly, mobile services have completely overwhelmed the market. By early 2009, there were nine mobile operators vigorously competing with each other in a market segment that was growing at an annual rate of more than 50%. There were 4.3 million mobile subscribers (penetration 29%) in the country by March 2009. The market was still in a very strong growth phase, as evidenced by the keenness shown by foreign operators seeking to be part of it.
Some limited fixed-line growth had earlier come about through investment under foreign assistance, but this has mainly benefited Phnom Penh and geographical coverage has not increased significantly since that effort in the 1990s. The number of fixed-line services was relatively static at around 40,000 by 2008. In the absence of any real fixed-line growth, mobile telephone services continue to completely dominate the overall telecom market in Cambodia, with mobiles representing more than 99% of the total number of telephone services in the country. This disparity has been growing more significant each year.
The expansion of Internet services has also been overshadowed by the mobile phenomenon. In fact Internet take-up remains disturbingly low, one of the lowest penetrations in the region. Of course, the limited fixed line infrastructure has been a major inhibiting factor in the roll-out of both dial-up and ADSL Internet services. One encouraging feature has been the general availability of Internet access in provincial towns.
It is worthwhile noting that wireless technology has been especially advantageous for Cambodia in achieving rapid network rollout and replacement of a fixed network badly damaged by 20 years of war. In addition to the thriving mobile networks, Wireless Local Loop has been useful for rapid provision of a limited number of fixed-line services. However, while Cambodia has exemplified the fact that WLL offers a viable option for rapidly expanding telecom access in developing countries with low levels of fixed infrastructure, the potential of this technology has yet to be fully exploited in the country.
Key highlights:
The year 2008 saw Cambodia’s mobile market continue on its positive expansion path, with annual growth of 56% for the year and continuing at 50%+ into 2009;
With 29% mobile penetration by March 2009, the mobile market had passed the 4 million subscriber milestone earlier in 2009;
With 3 new mobile operators coming to the market in 2008/09, Cambodia has a total of 9 operators in what has become a crowded and highly competitive market;
The development of fixed-line and Internet services continue to languish; the latter is particularly disconcerting as online access is crucial to national growth;
On the broader political front, National Assembly elections were held in 2008, with Hun Sen being returned to power; while the elections were generally regarded as credible, deficiencies remain.
This report provides an overview of the trends and developments in the telecommunications markets in Cambodia. Subjects covered include:
Key Statistics;
Market and Industry Overviews;
Major Operators (Mobile and Fixed)
Regulatory Environment;
Infrastructure;
Mobile Market;
Internet Market;Telecom market forecasts for selective years to 2018.
Cambodia - Telecoms, Mobile, Internet & Forecasts: http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/r.ashx?id=MS6ACE94T157551
Published on September 21, 2009
by Press Office
(Companiesandmarkets.com and OfficialWire)
LONDON, ENGLAND
Cambodia - Telecoms, Mobile, Internet & Forecasts
Despite its status as a least developed country and remaining one of the poorer countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia’s efforts to expand and upgrade its telecom infrastructure are bearing fruit. There was very little infrastructure remaining from before the tumultuous Khmer Rouge days. As a result, Cambodia bypassed rebuilding the fixed-line market and quickly launched into alternative technologies, jump-starting its telecommunications infrastructure with digital technology. Not surprisingly, mobile services have completely overwhelmed the market. By early 2009, there were nine mobile operators vigorously competing with each other in a market segment that was growing at an annual rate of more than 50%. There were 4.3 million mobile subscribers (penetration 29%) in the country by March 2009. The market was still in a very strong growth phase, as evidenced by the keenness shown by foreign operators seeking to be part of it.
Some limited fixed-line growth had earlier come about through investment under foreign assistance, but this has mainly benefited Phnom Penh and geographical coverage has not increased significantly since that effort in the 1990s. The number of fixed-line services was relatively static at around 40,000 by 2008. In the absence of any real fixed-line growth, mobile telephone services continue to completely dominate the overall telecom market in Cambodia, with mobiles representing more than 99% of the total number of telephone services in the country. This disparity has been growing more significant each year.
The expansion of Internet services has also been overshadowed by the mobile phenomenon. In fact Internet take-up remains disturbingly low, one of the lowest penetrations in the region. Of course, the limited fixed line infrastructure has been a major inhibiting factor in the roll-out of both dial-up and ADSL Internet services. One encouraging feature has been the general availability of Internet access in provincial towns.
It is worthwhile noting that wireless technology has been especially advantageous for Cambodia in achieving rapid network rollout and replacement of a fixed network badly damaged by 20 years of war. In addition to the thriving mobile networks, Wireless Local Loop has been useful for rapid provision of a limited number of fixed-line services. However, while Cambodia has exemplified the fact that WLL offers a viable option for rapidly expanding telecom access in developing countries with low levels of fixed infrastructure, the potential of this technology has yet to be fully exploited in the country.
Key highlights:
The year 2008 saw Cambodia’s mobile market continue on its positive expansion path, with annual growth of 56% for the year and continuing at 50%+ into 2009;
With 29% mobile penetration by March 2009, the mobile market had passed the 4 million subscriber milestone earlier in 2009;
With 3 new mobile operators coming to the market in 2008/09, Cambodia has a total of 9 operators in what has become a crowded and highly competitive market;
The development of fixed-line and Internet services continue to languish; the latter is particularly disconcerting as online access is crucial to national growth;
On the broader political front, National Assembly elections were held in 2008, with Hun Sen being returned to power; while the elections were generally regarded as credible, deficiencies remain.
This report provides an overview of the trends and developments in the telecommunications markets in Cambodia. Subjects covered include:
Key Statistics;
Market and Industry Overviews;
Major Operators (Mobile and Fixed)
Regulatory Environment;
Infrastructure;
Mobile Market;
Internet Market;Telecom market forecasts for selective years to 2018.
Cambodia - Telecoms, Mobile, Internet & Forecasts: http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/r.ashx?id=MS6ACE94T157551
Monday, September 21, 2009
Thai Nationalism Heats Up
Monday, September 21, 2009
By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN
The Irrawady
Thailand has not only been plagued by divisive domestic political turmoil. Its relations with neighboring Cambodia have also deteriorated and intensified, resulting in fatal clashes along their common border.
Competing political factions have incessantly used nationalism to legitimize their political activities. The violent confrontation between Thai nationalists and Cambodian villagers in the past few days could further strain this vulnerable bilateral relationship.
Nationalism in Thailand has become a highly destructive force both in domestic and international politics. From late 2007, in their campaign to topple the governments that emerged from the post-coup elections, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and some elements of the Democrat Party, claimed to represent the true face of Thai nationalism.
In this, they claimed to stand on the side of righteousness by protecting the nation’s territorial integrity, to rid the people of corrupt politicians, and in their duty to challenge an allegedly predatory neighbor.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and successive pro-Thaksin governments were grouped together with alien foreigners, like Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was regarded as a deranged person. These alien characters were represented as having a single objective: selling the country out and tarnishing the good reputation of Thailand built up by past monarchs.
The conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple, to the PAD, was indeed a conflict between those who are true Thais versus Thaksin suporters. It saw its duty as that of protecting Thailand’s national interests, and the best way to do so was to stir up nationalistic feelings.
At first glance, nationalism seemed to serve the political need of both the PAD and the Democrat Party. Both were unable to unseat Thaksin-backed governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat and to uproot Thaksin’s influence in politics. The Preah Vihear Temple issue emerged at the right moment when the PAD and also the military that supported anti-Thaksin sentiment were facing a legitimacy crisis themselves.
But little did they know that in employing the Preah Vihear conflict to eliminate Thaksin, the PAD was also jeopardizing its position in politics, and in particular endangering its representation of Thai nationalism. It played along with the theme of lost territories, falsifying historical facts and portraying Thailand as a vulnerable state perpetually victimized by immoral foreigners.
In this paranoid narrative, Thaksin was helping immoral foreigners to take away the country’s sacred assets and pride. The PAD then adopted certain nationalistic tactics against its opponents, such as condemning them for selling out the country and through its own rhetoric provoking military confrontations with the Cambodians.
The reality is that Preah Vihear Temple belongs to Cambodia, according to the International Court of Justice ruling of 1962. But the loss became an unacceptable political reality because it deals with the national pride that has been deeply ingrained in the mindset of Thais.
The outcome of these political tactics has been destructive. Thai domestic politics has become increasingly polarized. Thailand’s relations with Cambodia have reached a critical point, verging on full-blown war. Who has gained what out of this nationalistic crusade?
As a consequence, the issue of overlapping territories returned to the attention of the Thai public. The spirit of nationhood was high. Thaksin was once again labeled as a Thai who betrayed his motherland.
However, the PAD also became a casualty in the game of nationalism. It opened up a Pandora’s box of bewilderment about Thai self-identity. Was the PAD brand of nationalism a reflection of the Thai way to express love for country?
Didn’t its call for war with Cambodia run against its earlier representations of Thainess: of being a peaceful nation, as enunciated in the words of Thailand’s national anthem?
The PAD might have found nationalism an effective way of deposing of the Thaksin-backed regimes in the past, but the nationalist flame has been fanned and the conflagration has shown the potential to rage out of control.
The latest clashes near the Thai-Cambodian border demonstrated that the PAD is not willing to give up its nationalist tactics.
This is perhaps due to the fact that the PAD recently transformed itself into a legitimate political party—the New Politics Party. It now hopes to exploit the Preah Vihear Temple issue to score political points should elections be called by the current government in the next few months.
It is therefore anticipated that the temple issue will become more intense as Thailand heads into an even more uncertain future.
Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.
By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN
The Irrawady
Thailand has not only been plagued by divisive domestic political turmoil. Its relations with neighboring Cambodia have also deteriorated and intensified, resulting in fatal clashes along their common border.
Competing political factions have incessantly used nationalism to legitimize their political activities. The violent confrontation between Thai nationalists and Cambodian villagers in the past few days could further strain this vulnerable bilateral relationship.
Nationalism in Thailand has become a highly destructive force both in domestic and international politics. From late 2007, in their campaign to topple the governments that emerged from the post-coup elections, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and some elements of the Democrat Party, claimed to represent the true face of Thai nationalism.
In this, they claimed to stand on the side of righteousness by protecting the nation’s territorial integrity, to rid the people of corrupt politicians, and in their duty to challenge an allegedly predatory neighbor.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and successive pro-Thaksin governments were grouped together with alien foreigners, like Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was regarded as a deranged person. These alien characters were represented as having a single objective: selling the country out and tarnishing the good reputation of Thailand built up by past monarchs.
The conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple, to the PAD, was indeed a conflict between those who are true Thais versus Thaksin suporters. It saw its duty as that of protecting Thailand’s national interests, and the best way to do so was to stir up nationalistic feelings.
At first glance, nationalism seemed to serve the political need of both the PAD and the Democrat Party. Both were unable to unseat Thaksin-backed governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat and to uproot Thaksin’s influence in politics. The Preah Vihear Temple issue emerged at the right moment when the PAD and also the military that supported anti-Thaksin sentiment were facing a legitimacy crisis themselves.
But little did they know that in employing the Preah Vihear conflict to eliminate Thaksin, the PAD was also jeopardizing its position in politics, and in particular endangering its representation of Thai nationalism. It played along with the theme of lost territories, falsifying historical facts and portraying Thailand as a vulnerable state perpetually victimized by immoral foreigners.
In this paranoid narrative, Thaksin was helping immoral foreigners to take away the country’s sacred assets and pride. The PAD then adopted certain nationalistic tactics against its opponents, such as condemning them for selling out the country and through its own rhetoric provoking military confrontations with the Cambodians.
The reality is that Preah Vihear Temple belongs to Cambodia, according to the International Court of Justice ruling of 1962. But the loss became an unacceptable political reality because it deals with the national pride that has been deeply ingrained in the mindset of Thais.
The outcome of these political tactics has been destructive. Thai domestic politics has become increasingly polarized. Thailand’s relations with Cambodia have reached a critical point, verging on full-blown war. Who has gained what out of this nationalistic crusade?
As a consequence, the issue of overlapping territories returned to the attention of the Thai public. The spirit of nationhood was high. Thaksin was once again labeled as a Thai who betrayed his motherland.
However, the PAD also became a casualty in the game of nationalism. It opened up a Pandora’s box of bewilderment about Thai self-identity. Was the PAD brand of nationalism a reflection of the Thai way to express love for country?
Didn’t its call for war with Cambodia run against its earlier representations of Thainess: of being a peaceful nation, as enunciated in the words of Thailand’s national anthem?
The PAD might have found nationalism an effective way of deposing of the Thaksin-backed regimes in the past, but the nationalist flame has been fanned and the conflagration has shown the potential to rage out of control.
The latest clashes near the Thai-Cambodian border demonstrated that the PAD is not willing to give up its nationalist tactics.
This is perhaps due to the fact that the PAD recently transformed itself into a legitimate political party—the New Politics Party. It now hopes to exploit the Preah Vihear Temple issue to score political points should elections be called by the current government in the next few months.
It is therefore anticipated that the temple issue will become more intense as Thailand heads into an even more uncertain future.
Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.
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