by Shingo Ito Shingo Ito – Thu Aug 20, 12:13 am ET
TOKYO (AFP) – They are highly educated, mostly male and almost always wear grey suits, and now they are in the cross-hairs of the man who hopes to become Japan's next prime minister: government bureaucrats.
People the world over may love to hate civil servants, often accusing them of slowing down business and everyday life with a thicket of red tape, unnecessary rules and incomprehensible jargon.
But Japan's state bureaucrats, all 360,000 of them, are a slightly different species -- they may just be too good at what they do. Critics charge that it is they, not politicians, who have been running the country.
For too long, says Japan's opposition leader Yukio Hatoyama, the mandarins have quietly steered the ship of state and asked the elected lawmakers to rubber-stamp their decisions.
Hatoyama wants to clip their wings, a goal that is a key plank of his campaign platform ahead of the August 30 election which, polls have indicated, may well make him Japan's next prime minister.
The election, Hatoyama has said, will be a "revolutionary vote to create a new Japan with politician-led politics."
"In contrast with the bureaucrat-led politics... we will produce politics in which the public plays a leading role."
Hatoyama's centre-left Democratic Party of Japan is headed for a landslide win in elections this month, according to a newspaper's telephone survey of more than 60,000 voters published on Thursday.
The mass-circulation Asahi Shimbun daily predicted that the DPJ was "gathering momentum to win more than 300 seats" in the 480-seat lower house in the August 30 vote.
The Asahi cautioned that the trend may change greatly in the final days before the election as at least one out of three voters were either undecided or declined to say which party or candidate they would vote for.
Political observers have long said Japan's officials wield far greater power than their counterparts in other democracies when it comes to steering policy, drawing up laws and carving up state budgets.
The heads of ministries, who carry the rank of vice minister, are often seen as more powerful than the politicians whom they ostensibly serve.
When the top bureaucrats retire, they tend to parachute into cushy jobs in the companies and agencies they formerly supervised.
Hatoyama has also vowed to put an end to that practice -- dubbed "amakudari" or descent from heaven -- which has been blamed for breeding conflicts of interest, collusion and bid-rigging.
The special status of Japan's government servants dates to the seventh century when Japan introduced a bureaucracy modelled on ancient China's merit-based mandarin system.
Japan's best and brightest became bureaucrats, who commanded respect, even awe, as they directly served the emperor.
After Japan's defeat in World War II, when the political elite was removed from power, the bureaucrats were credited with guiding the nation on its path from post-war gloom through its economic miracle.
The officials did so by working hand in hand with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled almost without break since 1955, and with big business -- a cosy relationship often dubbed the "iron triangle."
The feats of Japan's bureaucrats are still revered and a popular TV drama celebrates the heroic efforts of 1960s-era trade ministry officials.
Critics charge that, in the process, the bureaucracy became an unstoppable force that, with very little accountability to the public, turned Japan into one of the world's most heavily regulated societies.
Author Alex Kerr argued in his book "Dogs and Demons" that ministries, bent on spending funds to maintain their annual budgets, have pursued wasteful 'pave-and-build' policies that have devastated Japan's countryside.
Bureaucrats have also drawn fire when graft, waste or mismanagement have been exposed, such as the loss of tens of thousands of state pension records.
The LDP's reformist former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi stared down a stronghold of the bureaucracy when he launched the break-up of the massive postal system, a behemoth with large banking and insurance arms.
Now Hatoyama wants to rein in the officials to a far greater extent, promising to deploy 100 lawmakers to supervise ministries and, crucially, wrest back control of the budget process from the finance ministry.
He has pledged to set up a national strategy office under the prime minister's direct control which would compile the budget, draft diplomatic statements and author other key government policies.
Hatoyama's proposed sweep of the officialdom is timely, say some experts.
"The bureaucracy worked well when Japan was trying to catch up with other countries," said Fusao Ushiro, a politics professor at Nagoya University.
"But since Japan has already achieved that goal, there is greater urgency for creative thinking, which is not common or encouraged among bureaucrats. The era of the bureaucrats may be coming to an end."
Some experts though warn that Japan's civil servants may die hard, and could even stall the Democratic Party of Japan's reformist plans.
"No matter who governs the country, they will need bureaucrats," said Tetsuro Kato, politics professor at Tokyo's Hitotsubashi University.
"The question is how effectively Japan can make use of the elite group."
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Monday, August 17, 2009
Cambodia: Appointment Of Judges
Monday, 17 August 2009, 12:38 pm
Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission
Cambodia: Appointment Of Judges And Prosecutors Is Unconstitutional
Lately there has been a hectic time within the Cambodian judiciary with the actual and planned retirement and appointments of many judges and prosecutors. The government has retired and replaced half of the members, two ex-officio and two appointed, of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy (SCM), the supreme judicial body responsible for the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors. A further 27 are also to be retired. In the meantime, some 32 judges and prosecutors, including four who are the de facto age of retirement of 60, have been appointed to new positions.
In a statement dated 7 August 2009 (see CAMBODIA: Law on the statute of judges, not their retirement, is the right end from which to tackle judicial reform), the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has already pointed out the unconstitutionality of the government’s infringement upon the jurisdiction and independence of the SCM when it had bypassed it and retired and replaced those four SCM members. According to the country’s Constitution, the nomination, including appointment, retirement and transfer, as well as the discipline of judges and prosecutors are the responsibility of the SCM, and not that of the government. The SCM is the supreme body of the judiciary which is chaired by the country’s king and which also has the responsibility of ensuring judicial independence.
The AHRC has also urged the Cambodian government to enact two long-overdue laws which the country has specifically stipulated (Art.135 of the Constitution) and which would provide the legal background and framework for the judiciary as required under Art.14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the right to a fair trial by an independent, competent and impartial tribunal established by law. With the law on the statute of judges and prosecutors, the age of retirement would be officially fixed and known, and actual retirement could be set without arousing any suspicion of favouritism for those who wish to remain in active service.
The AHRC has further noticed that the appointment of judges and prosecutors, as shown in the king’s successive appointment decrees, has not respected the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as enshrined the country’s Constitutions (Arts 51 and 128). In these appointments, the Minister of Justice, a cabinet member and also a member of the SCM, has made nomination proposals, received the approval of the SCM and submitted them to the king for signing. For some appointments, the SCM has been bypassed altogether and the proposals directly submitted to the king for signature.
This practice contravenes Art 134 of the country’s Constitution which says, among other things, that “The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall make proposals to the King on the appointment of judges and prosecutors to all courts.” It should be declared unconstitutional when, according Art. 150 of the same Constitution, “Laws and decisions by the State institutions shall have to be in strict conformity with the Constitution.”
The Cambodian government and its ministry of justice in particular seem to have exploited the absence of the constitutional review or any other forms of judicial review of their decisions and have tried to rule by decree, at least in appointment and retirement of judges and prosecutors. The constitutional review of laws seems clear cut when a specific number of public figures and even ordinary citizens may request for it. However, there is almost a complete silence over the constitutional review of decisions of state institutions, the government and its ministries included. Only a litigant who feels his or her rights are affected by such a decision could raise the issue of its unconstitutionality with the Constitutional Council through the Supreme Court. Unlike in the case of promulgated laws, neither any public figure mentioned above nor any concerned citizen may request for the constitutional review of decisions of state institutions. Nor is the Constitutional Council habilitated to do this constitutional
The AHRC strongly urges the Minister of Justice to respect the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and the SCM, refrain from infringing upon the jurisdiction of the SCM, and let this supreme judicial body fully exercise its full constitutional authority over the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors. The Minister of Justice should relinquish its control of the SCM Secretariat and transfer it back where it belongs, that is, to the SCM. It should instead secure for the SCM adequate resources to enable it to fulfill its constitutional duties in the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors, and in the independence of the judiciary.
AHRC further urges that all decisions of state institutions, including those of the government and the Ministry of Justice regarding the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors as well as the independence of the judiciary, should be in strict conformity with the Constitution as specifically stipulated under its Art 150. The Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Constitutional Council should therefore be amended in order to subject such decisions to the same constitutional review as all laws.
About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.
Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission
Cambodia: Appointment Of Judges And Prosecutors Is Unconstitutional
Lately there has been a hectic time within the Cambodian judiciary with the actual and planned retirement and appointments of many judges and prosecutors. The government has retired and replaced half of the members, two ex-officio and two appointed, of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy (SCM), the supreme judicial body responsible for the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors. A further 27 are also to be retired. In the meantime, some 32 judges and prosecutors, including four who are the de facto age of retirement of 60, have been appointed to new positions.
In a statement dated 7 August 2009 (see CAMBODIA: Law on the statute of judges, not their retirement, is the right end from which to tackle judicial reform), the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has already pointed out the unconstitutionality of the government’s infringement upon the jurisdiction and independence of the SCM when it had bypassed it and retired and replaced those four SCM members. According to the country’s Constitution, the nomination, including appointment, retirement and transfer, as well as the discipline of judges and prosecutors are the responsibility of the SCM, and not that of the government. The SCM is the supreme body of the judiciary which is chaired by the country’s king and which also has the responsibility of ensuring judicial independence.
The AHRC has also urged the Cambodian government to enact two long-overdue laws which the country has specifically stipulated (Art.135 of the Constitution) and which would provide the legal background and framework for the judiciary as required under Art.14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the right to a fair trial by an independent, competent and impartial tribunal established by law. With the law on the statute of judges and prosecutors, the age of retirement would be officially fixed and known, and actual retirement could be set without arousing any suspicion of favouritism for those who wish to remain in active service.
The AHRC has further noticed that the appointment of judges and prosecutors, as shown in the king’s successive appointment decrees, has not respected the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as enshrined the country’s Constitutions (Arts 51 and 128). In these appointments, the Minister of Justice, a cabinet member and also a member of the SCM, has made nomination proposals, received the approval of the SCM and submitted them to the king for signing. For some appointments, the SCM has been bypassed altogether and the proposals directly submitted to the king for signature.
This practice contravenes Art 134 of the country’s Constitution which says, among other things, that “The Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall make proposals to the King on the appointment of judges and prosecutors to all courts.” It should be declared unconstitutional when, according Art. 150 of the same Constitution, “Laws and decisions by the State institutions shall have to be in strict conformity with the Constitution.”
The Cambodian government and its ministry of justice in particular seem to have exploited the absence of the constitutional review or any other forms of judicial review of their decisions and have tried to rule by decree, at least in appointment and retirement of judges and prosecutors. The constitutional review of laws seems clear cut when a specific number of public figures and even ordinary citizens may request for it. However, there is almost a complete silence over the constitutional review of decisions of state institutions, the government and its ministries included. Only a litigant who feels his or her rights are affected by such a decision could raise the issue of its unconstitutionality with the Constitutional Council through the Supreme Court. Unlike in the case of promulgated laws, neither any public figure mentioned above nor any concerned citizen may request for the constitutional review of decisions of state institutions. Nor is the Constitutional Council habilitated to do this constitutional
The AHRC strongly urges the Minister of Justice to respect the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary and the SCM, refrain from infringing upon the jurisdiction of the SCM, and let this supreme judicial body fully exercise its full constitutional authority over the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors. The Minister of Justice should relinquish its control of the SCM Secretariat and transfer it back where it belongs, that is, to the SCM. It should instead secure for the SCM adequate resources to enable it to fulfill its constitutional duties in the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors, and in the independence of the judiciary.
AHRC further urges that all decisions of state institutions, including those of the government and the Ministry of Justice regarding the nomination and discipline of judges and prosecutors as well as the independence of the judiciary, should be in strict conformity with the Constitution as specifically stipulated under its Art 150. The Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Constitutional Council should therefore be amended in order to subject such decisions to the same constitutional review as all laws.
About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.
Saturday, August 15, 2009
Civil servants uneasy as DPJ plots change in power game
U.K.-style tack eyed to dilute bureaucracy
The Japan Times
By ALEX MARTIN
Staff writer
Saturday, Aug. 15, 2009
When vice farm minister Michio Ide in June criticized the Democratic Party of Japan's plans to subsidize farmers' income as unrealistic, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama quickly fired back.
"Bureaucrats need to be fair and neutral," Hatoyama said, adding that if bureaucrats in Britain had made such remarks, "they'd be sacked."
The incident highlighted the marked discord rising between the civil servants and the DPJ, which is boldly vowing to place the administrative power of the government in the hands of politicians if the opposition party takes power in the Aug. 30 general election.
But questions remain on how the DPJ plans to do this, and how the transition from a half century of governance by the Liberal Democratic Party — and its mandarins in the bureaucracy — would be achieved.
In June, DPJ Deputy President Naoto Kan took a six-day trip to Britain to hold talks with officials from the government and opposition parties about power transitions and the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians.
The trip implies that the DPJ has a strong interest in adopting Britain's Westminster system, in which power is concentrated in the Cabinet at the expense of the governing party and the bureaucracy.
In Britain, more than 100 members of the ruling party enter the government as Cabinet members or junior ministers. Policymaking is conducted based on the ruling party's platform, with policy-proposing capabilities centralized in the Cabinet.
Bureaucrats are expected to remain neutral in shaping and supporting policies in Britain, where a firm two-party system produces frequent regime change.
Upon his return, Kan published his thoughts on the topic in the July issue of Chuo Koron magazine, where he outlined his plans on how to concentrate power in the Cabinet by abolishing the customary practices that allowed the bureaucracy to accumulate its vast power over the years.
Kan, who was Lower House chairman of the foreign policy council under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's Cabinet in 1993 — the first non-LDP government in 38 years — got firsthand experience watching how regime change can go awry.
Hosokawa's eight-party ruling coalition was often beset by policy differences that erupted between its center-right and leftist wings, and he abruptly resigned after less than a year in office as a looming personal financial scandal threatened to force him out.
In the magazine essay, Kan mentions how the soon-to-be-appointed prime minister's secretary — a former bureaucrat — began arranging Hosokawa's schedule even before the Diet elected him prime minister.
A similar thing happened when Kan was health minister in LDP Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's Cabinet in 1996. As soon as he was appointed, the ministry's anonymous chief secretary quickly began arranging everything, from his personal secretary and press conference memos for the Cabinet's formation, to his role in the Cabinet's confirmation ceremony at the Imperial Palace.
Kan said in the essay that he now understands how bureaucrats begin scripting politicians' every move from the earliest stages of a Cabinet. "It was all very strange," he wrote.
To subvert that system, the DPJ has drafted proposals in its policy platform that would, theoretically at least, put administrative power in the hands of lawmakers.
The DPJ proposes appointing more than 100 members of the ruling party to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level posts to strengthen the government. It also suggests that the chairman of the DPJ Policy Research Council double as a Cabinet member so policy decisions can be made from within the Cabinet.
By concentrating power within the government and the party, the DPJ said the preliminary review of legislation — a customary LDP practice that has allowed the vested interests of lawmakers and bureaucrats alike to influence legislation — would become unnecessary.
The DPJ plans on eliminating these processes as well as and banning vice ministers from expressing their opinions during press conferences, as vice farm minister Ide did in June.
Another plan central to the transition from bureaucratic to political rule is a national strategy office, a body under the direct control of the prime minister. This office would be responsible for compiling the budget and drafting foreign policy documents. Its staff would include both private-sector experts and bureaucrats.
In the past, for example, budgetary request guidelines were decided by the Finance Ministry. The DPJ says this authority would be handed over to the national strategy office.
The DPJ also plans on setting up an administrative reform council that would be responsible for cutting wasteful spending to secure the finances needed for developing policy.
During an interview July 31, Hatoyama said all of the party's plans should be legislated simultaneously as the DPJ-led government starts up. He said he plans to kick things off by holding an extraordinary Diet session in the fall.
However, such a drastic overhaul of the administrative system is bound to face enormous resistance from the bureaucracy, analysts say.
Fukashi Horie, a well-versed political observer and professor emeritus at Keio University, said that although he believes the DPJ still hasn't reached a practical conclusion on how to put its plans in motion, constant maneuvering by self-interested bureaucrats bent on influencing legislation is unavoidable.
"It's already difficult enough to enact laws without loopholes," Horie said, stressing that even if the DPJ succeeded in passing such bills through the Diet, the next issue would be how to control the bureaucrats.
"What will be required from now on is the ability to pin down and control the bureaucrats — to cajole them at times, or growl at them depending on the situation, to gain their cooperation — and that is a very difficult thing to do," he said.
Jun Saito, a former DPJ Upper House legislator who teaches political science at Yale, added that it also will be important for the DPJ to establish realistic expectations among the public that it will be in power for at least the next few years, and possibly more.
"Systemic reforms take effort and time. Winning next year's Upper House election will also be an important agenda item," he said. "Because the LDP has owned the bureaucracy, DPJ politicians have lacked the resources to formulate policies. The DPJ will need to take time to get (its) policies actually enacted and implemented, but I believe (it) will get things done."
The Japan Times
By ALEX MARTIN
Staff writer
Saturday, Aug. 15, 2009
When vice farm minister Michio Ide in June criticized the Democratic Party of Japan's plans to subsidize farmers' income as unrealistic, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama quickly fired back.
"Bureaucrats need to be fair and neutral," Hatoyama said, adding that if bureaucrats in Britain had made such remarks, "they'd be sacked."
The incident highlighted the marked discord rising between the civil servants and the DPJ, which is boldly vowing to place the administrative power of the government in the hands of politicians if the opposition party takes power in the Aug. 30 general election.
But questions remain on how the DPJ plans to do this, and how the transition from a half century of governance by the Liberal Democratic Party — and its mandarins in the bureaucracy — would be achieved.
In June, DPJ Deputy President Naoto Kan took a six-day trip to Britain to hold talks with officials from the government and opposition parties about power transitions and the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians.
The trip implies that the DPJ has a strong interest in adopting Britain's Westminster system, in which power is concentrated in the Cabinet at the expense of the governing party and the bureaucracy.
In Britain, more than 100 members of the ruling party enter the government as Cabinet members or junior ministers. Policymaking is conducted based on the ruling party's platform, with policy-proposing capabilities centralized in the Cabinet.
Bureaucrats are expected to remain neutral in shaping and supporting policies in Britain, where a firm two-party system produces frequent regime change.
Upon his return, Kan published his thoughts on the topic in the July issue of Chuo Koron magazine, where he outlined his plans on how to concentrate power in the Cabinet by abolishing the customary practices that allowed the bureaucracy to accumulate its vast power over the years.
Kan, who was Lower House chairman of the foreign policy council under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's Cabinet in 1993 — the first non-LDP government in 38 years — got firsthand experience watching how regime change can go awry.
Hosokawa's eight-party ruling coalition was often beset by policy differences that erupted between its center-right and leftist wings, and he abruptly resigned after less than a year in office as a looming personal financial scandal threatened to force him out.
In the magazine essay, Kan mentions how the soon-to-be-appointed prime minister's secretary — a former bureaucrat — began arranging Hosokawa's schedule even before the Diet elected him prime minister.
A similar thing happened when Kan was health minister in LDP Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's Cabinet in 1996. As soon as he was appointed, the ministry's anonymous chief secretary quickly began arranging everything, from his personal secretary and press conference memos for the Cabinet's formation, to his role in the Cabinet's confirmation ceremony at the Imperial Palace.
Kan said in the essay that he now understands how bureaucrats begin scripting politicians' every move from the earliest stages of a Cabinet. "It was all very strange," he wrote.
To subvert that system, the DPJ has drafted proposals in its policy platform that would, theoretically at least, put administrative power in the hands of lawmakers.
The DPJ proposes appointing more than 100 members of the ruling party to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level posts to strengthen the government. It also suggests that the chairman of the DPJ Policy Research Council double as a Cabinet member so policy decisions can be made from within the Cabinet.
By concentrating power within the government and the party, the DPJ said the preliminary review of legislation — a customary LDP practice that has allowed the vested interests of lawmakers and bureaucrats alike to influence legislation — would become unnecessary.
The DPJ plans on eliminating these processes as well as and banning vice ministers from expressing their opinions during press conferences, as vice farm minister Ide did in June.
Another plan central to the transition from bureaucratic to political rule is a national strategy office, a body under the direct control of the prime minister. This office would be responsible for compiling the budget and drafting foreign policy documents. Its staff would include both private-sector experts and bureaucrats.
In the past, for example, budgetary request guidelines were decided by the Finance Ministry. The DPJ says this authority would be handed over to the national strategy office.
The DPJ also plans on setting up an administrative reform council that would be responsible for cutting wasteful spending to secure the finances needed for developing policy.
During an interview July 31, Hatoyama said all of the party's plans should be legislated simultaneously as the DPJ-led government starts up. He said he plans to kick things off by holding an extraordinary Diet session in the fall.
However, such a drastic overhaul of the administrative system is bound to face enormous resistance from the bureaucracy, analysts say.
Fukashi Horie, a well-versed political observer and professor emeritus at Keio University, said that although he believes the DPJ still hasn't reached a practical conclusion on how to put its plans in motion, constant maneuvering by self-interested bureaucrats bent on influencing legislation is unavoidable.
"It's already difficult enough to enact laws without loopholes," Horie said, stressing that even if the DPJ succeeded in passing such bills through the Diet, the next issue would be how to control the bureaucrats.
"What will be required from now on is the ability to pin down and control the bureaucrats — to cajole them at times, or growl at them depending on the situation, to gain their cooperation — and that is a very difficult thing to do," he said.
Jun Saito, a former DPJ Upper House legislator who teaches political science at Yale, added that it also will be important for the DPJ to establish realistic expectations among the public that it will be in power for at least the next few years, and possibly more.
"Systemic reforms take effort and time. Winning next year's Upper House election will also be an important agenda item," he said. "Because the LDP has owned the bureaucracy, DPJ politicians have lacked the resources to formulate policies. The DPJ will need to take time to get (its) policies actually enacted and implemented, but I believe (it) will get things done."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
